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Book 2 — Chapter 3

To Those Who Commend Persons To Philosophers

Translated by P.E. Matheson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1916)

Sonnet 4.6 Summary

Sonnet 4.6 Summary

Very short. Diogenes's point: a letter of introduction to a philosopher is useless. If the philosopher has the judgment to assess a person, no letter is needed; if he doesn't, ten thousand letters won't help. A drachma doesn't need to be introduced to an assayer — it either passes or it doesn't.

Epictetus turns this into a self-critique: he can judge syllogisms because he's trained in them. But in life he sometimes calls things good, sometimes evil, inconsistently — because he hasn't achieved the same mastery there. The chapter is a rare moment of genuine self-examination rather than instruction.

Text

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THAT is a good answer of Diogenes to one who asked him for letters of introduction: 'You are a man, and that his eyes will tell him; but whether you are good or bad he will discover, if he has skill to distinguish the good from the bad; and if he has not that skill, he will never discover it, though I should write him ten thousand letters.' A drachma might just as well ask to be introduced to some one in order to be tested. If the man is a judge of silver, you will introduce yourself. We ought, therefore, to have some faculty to guide us in life, as the assayer has in dealing with silver, that I may be able to say as he does, 'Give me any drachma you please, and I will distinguish.' Now I can deal with a syllogism and say, 'Bring any one you like, and I will distinguish between him who can analyse syllogisms and him who cannot.' Why? Because I know how to analyse them: I have the faculty a man must have who is to recognize those who can handle syllogisms aright. But when I have to deal with life, how do I behave? Sometimes I call a thing good, sometimes evil. And the reason is just this, that whereas I have knowledge of syllogisms, I have no knowledge or experience of life.